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_____________ 
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ATTORNEY GENERAL UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 
                                                               Respondent 
______________ 
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(A040-015-082) 
Immigration Judge:  Walter A. Durling 
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Argued January 19, 2018 
______________ 
 
Before: SMITH, Chief Judge, GREENAWAY, JR., and 
KRAUSE, Circuit Judges. 
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______________ 
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______________ 
 
Charles N. Curcio [ARGUED] 
Curcio Law Firm 
3547 Alpine Avenue NW 
Suite 104 
Grand Rapids, MI 49544 
 Attorney for Petitioner 
 
  
Stefanie N. Hennes [ARGUED] 
United States Department of Justice  
Office of Immigration Litigation  
P.O. Box 878  
Ben Franklin Station  
Washington, DC 20044 
 Attorney for Respondent 
 
 
GREENAWAY, JR., Circuit Judge. 
 
 In plain terms, we are called to decide whether 
precluding a father from ever having his born-out-of-wedlock 
child derive citizenship through him can be squared with the 
equal-protection mandate of the Due Process Clause of the 
Fifth Amendment.   
 In not so plain terms, under the now repealed 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1432(a)(2), a “child” born outside of the United States to 
noncitizen parents became a citizen upon the naturalization of 
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her surviving parent if one of her parents was deceased.1  
Section 1101(c)(1) in turn defined “child” as including a child 
born out of wedlock only in so far as the child was legitimated 
under the “law of the child’s residence or domicile” or “the law 
of the father’s residence or domicile . . . except as otherwise 
provided in . . .”  § 1432.  8 U.S.C. § 1101(c)(1).  Section 
1432(a)(3) rounded out the triumvirate and exempted mothers 
of born-out-of-wedlock children from the legitimation 
requirement by expressly adding that “the naturalization of the 
mother” was sufficient “if the child was born out of wedlock 
and the paternity of the child has not been established by 
legitimation . . . .”  See § 1432(a)(3).   
 As a result, §§ 1101(c)(1), 1432(a)(2) and (a)(3) treated 
women and men differently:  a naturalized mother could 
transmit her citizenship to her out-of-wedlock child, regardless 
of whether the father was alive; whereas a naturalized father in 
the same position had the additional requirement of having to 
legitimate the child in order to transmit his citizenship.   
 Our present concern is not with this differential 
treatment, however.  That affirmative steps to verify paternity, 
including legitimation, may be taken if a citizen parent is an 
unwed father has withstood constitutional scrutiny in the past, 
on the basis that the relation between a mother and a child “is 
verifiable from the birth itself,” and likewise “the opportunity 
                                                 
 1 That is, provided that (1) the naturalization takes place 
while the child is under eighteen years old, and (2) (a) the child 
is residing in the United States as a lawful permanent resident 
when the parent naturalizes or (b) thereafter begins to reside 
permanently while under the age of eighteen.  8 U.S.C. 
§ 1432(a)(4) & (5).   
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for the development of a relationship between citizen parent 
and child . . . .”  Nguyen v. INS., 533 U.S. 53, 62, 65 (2001); 
see also Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762, 771 (1977) (“The 
more serious problems of proving paternity might justify a 
more demanding standard for illegitimate children claiming 
under their fathers’ estates than that required for [those] 
claiming under their mothers’ estates . . . .” (emphasis added)).  
Rather, like in Trimble, the present concern is with a father 
being forever precluded from having his out-of-wedlock child 
derive through him.  This problem only arises where the child’s 
mother is deceased, and the only avenue for legitimation under 
the relevant law is through the marriage of the parents.  In that 
instance, naturalized fathers cannot transmit their citizenship 
to their out-of-wedlock children as a result of the interplay 
between §§ 1101(c) and 1432(a)(2), whereas naturalized 
mothers can via at least § 1432 (a)(3).   
 Such is the case with the petition before us.  Petitioner 
Jose Francisco Tineo was born in the Dominican Republic to 
unwed noncitizen parents who never married.  His father 
moved to the United States and naturalized.  His noncitizen 
mother soon after passed away.  At the time, under the law of 
either his or his father’s residence or domicile—the Dominican 
Republic and New York—legitimation could only occur if his 
birth parents married.  So Tineo’s father was forever precluded 
from having his son derive citizenship through him, despite 
being a citizen and having cared for his son until the child was 
21 years old.  On the cusp of being removed from the United 
States as a noncitizen, Tineo brings this Fifth Amendment 
challenge to the relevant provisions on behalf of his now 
deceased naturalized father.  We hold that, in this 
circumstance, the interplay of §§ 1101(c)(1), 1432(a)(2) and 
(a)(3) cannot be squared with the equal-protection mandate of 
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the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.  We will 
therefore grant Tineo’s petition.   
I. Background 
 
A. Arrival in the United States 
 Tineo was born in the Dominican Republic on January 
16, 1969.  His parents, both citizens of the Dominican 
Republic, never married.  His father, Felipe Tineo, moved to 
the United States and became a naturalized U.S. citizen in 
1981.  Two years later, his father married a legal permanent 
resident.   
 Tineo came to live with his father once his birth mother 
died in 1984.  He was admitted to the United States as a lawful 
permanent resident on June 15, 1985, pursuant to an alien 
relative petition filed by his stepmother.  He was 15 years old 
at the time and lived with his father until he turned 21 in 1990. 
B. Removal Proceedings 
 Felipe Tineo died an American in 2006.  The question 
of his son’s citizenship has come up on two occasions:  once 
before his death and once after.  Both were in the context of 
removal proceedings.  This is in part because only noncitizens 
may be removed.  See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(a)(1); see also Ng 
Fung Ho v. White, 259 U.S. 276, 284 (1922) (“Jurisdiction in 
the executive to order [removal] exists only if the person . . . is 
a [noncitizen].  An assertion of U.S. citizenship is thus a denial 
of an essential jurisdictional fact in a [removal] proceeding.” 
(internal quotation marks omitted)) (quoted in Minasyan v. 
Gonzales, 401 F.3d 1069, 1075 (9th Cir. 2005)); Gonzalez-
Alarcon v. Macias, 884 F.3d 1266, 1272 (10th Cir. 2018) 
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(noting that citizenship constitutes the denial of an essential 
jurisdictional fact in a removal proceeding because only 
noncitizens are removable).  As a consequence, immigration 
judges terminate removal proceedings where the government 
cannot demonstrate that a petitioner is a removable noncitizen.  
See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(3)(A); 8 C.F.R. § 240.8(a); see also 
Dessouki v. Att’y Gen. of U.S., 915 F.3d 964, 966 (3d Cir. 
2019) (“[T]he government failed to prove that Dessouki was [a 
noncitizen].  So an immigration judge terminated his removal 
proceedings.”). 
1.  
 The first proceeding occurred when Tineo was 
convicted for the sale of a controlled substance in New York 
state court on October 19, 1993.  He was issued a Notice to 
Appear (“NTA”) dated April 20, 2000 and placed in removal 
proceedings based on that conviction.  The proceeding was 
terminated on November 28, 2001, however, because, as proof 
of his citizenship, Tineo produced a United States passport that 
was issued to him in 2001.2  
                                                 
 2 Some confusion exists in the record as to the status of 
this passport.  While the NTA charges that Tineo obtained this 
passport by using fraudulent documents, there is no evidence 
to support this claim.  The passport application indicates that 
the only documents attached as exhibits were Tineo’s birth 
certificate, his mother’s death certificate, his father’s 
naturalization certificate, and a “memo of law,” which is not in 
the record before us.  A.R. 302.   
 In addition, Tineo clearly disagreed with the IJ when the 
IJ stated that he had “falsely represented that [he] was a [U.S.] 
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2.  
 The second occasion arose pursuant to an NTA issued 
on October 14, 2014.  The NTA charged several bases for 
Tineo’s removal, stemming from three events.3  
 First, Tineo was convicted on July 8, 2002, of the sale 
of a controlled substance in New York state court, thus making 
him inadmissible pursuant to 8 U.S.C. §§ 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(II) 
and (a)(2)(C). 
                                                 
citizen to gain entry to this country.”  A.R. 111.  Thus, we 
cannot find support for the IJ’s statement that Tineo admitted 
to obtaining this passport using fraudulent documents.  While 
not germane to our ultimate decision, we nonetheless wish to 
note the lack of any evidence in the record of fraud in 
connection with Tineo’s original passport application.  As far 
as we can discern, the issuance of this passport in 2001 did not 
occur because of any fraudulent misrepresentations made by 
Tineo.   
 3 Since, according to the government, Tineo was not 
admitted in 2008 when he returned to the United States from a 
trip abroad, the statutes cited in the NTA involve grounds for 
inadmissibility.  Because the Illegal Immigration Reform and 
Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 eliminated separate 
exclusion and deportation proceedings, creating instead a 
single removal proceeding, Austin T. Fragomen, et al., 
Fragomen on Immigration Fundamentals: A Guide to Law and 
Practice § 1:3.3[D] (PLI) (5th ed. 2019), this technicality does 
not impact our analysis. 
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 Second, on January 15, 2008, upon returning to the 
United States after a trip abroad, Tineo presented the passport 
issued to him in 2001.  The NTA charged that “[i]n doing so, 
[he] falsely represented [him]self to be a [U.S.] Citizen . . .  to 
gain entry into the United States,” thus violating § 
1182(a)(6)(C)(i) and (ii).  A.R. 890.  The NTA also charged 
Tineo as being an alien present in the United States without 
being admitted or paroled, in violation of § 1182(a)(6)(A)(i).  
This violation was based on the fact that, because Tineo used a 
United States passport to enter the country and “U.S. Citizens 
are not inspected, [Tineo] entered without being admitted or 
paroled after inspection by an Immigration Officer.”  A.R. 377.   
 The third event providing a basis for Tineo’s removal 
was his conviction in 2014 of passport fraud and aggravated 
identity theft in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania.  This 
conviction arose when, after his passport expired, Tineo 
attempted to obtain a new passport using the name Luis Padilla.  
Tineo presented several identification documents in the name 
Luis Padilla in support of his passport application.  Based on 
this conviction, the NTA charged Tineo as inadmissible, 
pursuant to § 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(I).  
C. Challenges to Removal 
 Appearing pro se before the immigration judge, Tineo 
admitted to his criminal convictions, but challenged his 
removability on the grounds that (1) he derived citizenship 
through his father and (2) this was evinced by his legally 
obtained first passport.4  
                                                 
 4 Tineo also sought relief pursuant to the Convention 
Against Torture but did not raise that claim in his opening brief 
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1.  
 His derivative citizenship claim was based on former 8 
U.S.C. § 1432(a),5 which provides that:   
A child born outside of the United States of alien 
parents, or of an alien parent and a citizen parent 
who has subsequently lost citizenship of the 
United States, becomes a citizen of the United 
States upon fulfillment of the following 
conditions: 
                                                 
before this Court.  It is therefore waived.  See United States v. 
Pelullo, 399 F.3d 197, 222 (3d Cir. 2005) (“It is well settled 
that an appellant’s failure to identify or argue an issue in his 
opening brief constitutes waiver of that issue on appeal.”) 
(citations omitted).   
 5 As we have noted, 
Congress repealed section 1432(a) by enacting 
the Child Citizenship Act of 2000 [(“CCA”)], § 
103, [8 U.S.C. §§ 1431–33 (2001)].  The [CCA] 
became effective on February 27, 2001, 120 days 
following its enactment.  Because all relevant 
events respecting [Petitioner]’s claimed 
derivative citizenship occurred prior to the 
[CCA]’s effective date, [§] 1432(a) controls our 
analysis.  
Brandao v. Att’y. Gen. of U.S., 654 F.3d 427, 428 n.1 (3d Cir. 
2011).   
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(1) The naturalization of both parents; or 
(2) The naturalization of the surviving parent if 
one of the parents is deceased;[6] or 
(3) The naturalization of the parent having legal 
custody of the child when there has been a legal 
separation of the parents or the naturalization of 
the mother if the child was born out of wedlock 
and the paternity of the child has not been 
established by legitimation; and if 
(4) Such naturalization takes place while such 
child is under the age of eighteen years; and 
(5) Such child is residing in the United States 
pursuant to a lawful admission for permanent 
residence at the time of the naturalization of the 
parent last naturalized under clause (1) of this 
subsection, or the parent naturalized under clause 
(2) or (3) of this subsection, or thereafter begins 
                                                 
 6 Read literally, § 1432(a)(2) appears to require that first 
one parent has to die and then the second parent has to 
naturalize.  But the United States Citizenship and Immigration 
Services (“USCIS”) has determined that the order of events 
does not matter, so long as all events occur before the child’s 
eighteenth birthday.  Matter of Baires-Larios, 24 I. & N. Dec. 
467, 470 (BIA 2008) (quoting Adjudicator’s Field Manual, ch. 
71, § 71.1(d)(2), U.S. CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION 
SERVICES, (Feb. 2008), 
http://www.uscis.gov/propub/DocView/afmid/1/172). The 
parties do not question this practice.   
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to reside permanently in the United States while 
under the age of eighteen years. 
8 U.S.C. § 1432(a) (repealed by Pub. L. No. 106-395, Title I, 
§ 103(a), Oct. 30, 2000, 114 Stat. 1632) (emphasis added).  
 The statute defines “child” as meaning:  
an unmarried person under twenty-one years of 
age and includes a child legitimated under the 
law of the child’s residence or domicile, or under 
the law of the father’s residence or domicile, 
whether in the United States or elsewhere . . . . 
§ 1101(c)(1) (emphasis added).7   
                                                 
 7 The definition continues to also include a child 
adopted in the United States if, as to both adopted and 
legitimated children and except as otherwise provided in 
sections 1431 and 1432 of the title:   
such legitimation or adoption takes place before 
the child reaches the age of 16 years (except to 
the extent that the child is described in 
subparagraph (E)(ii) or (F)(ii) of subsection 
(b)(1)), and the child is in the legal custody of the 
legitimating or adopting parent or parents at the 
time of such legitimation or adoption. 
§ 1101(c)(1). 
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 The United States Citizenship and Immigration 
Services (“USCIS”) interpreted the language beginning with 
“and includes” as restricting the meaning of child to exclude 
children born out of wedlock who were not legitimated, 
regardless of whether they were unmarried and under the age 
of 21.  When Tineo filed an application for a certificate of 
citizenship—also known as a Form N-600—in 2007, USCIS 
denied his application because he was “a child born out of 
wedlock” and “had not been legitimated by his [U.S.] citizen 
father . . . .”  App 4.  In denying Tineo’s derivative citizenship 
claim, the Immigration Judge (IJ) stated that “[t]he CIS denial 
letter [regarding the N-600 application] . . . correctly noted the 
law.”  App. 10.  That is, “children born out of wedlock who 
have not been legitimated are not included in the definition of 
‘child’ under the INA.”  App. 10.8    
                                                 
 8 As Tineo points out, this reading is counterintuitive 
and counter-textual, for it requires a tortured construction of 
the phrase “and includes.”  It also implies that a child born out 
of wedlock that is seeking to derive citizenship through her 
mother must also be legitimated under the law of her own 
residence or domicile or that of her father.  This implication 
came to bear when Congress passed the CCA.   
 The CCA repealed former § 1432(a) and enacted § 
1431(a) in its place.  The new provision did away with § 
1432(a)(3) such that it remained an open question as to whether 
§ 1101(c)(1)’s legitimation requirement would extend to 
mothers.  The White House Office of Legal Counsel examined 
the issue, labeled § 1101(c)(1) “poorly drafted,” and outlined a 
number of permissible interpretations that would avoid 
imposing a legitimation requirement on mothers.  See 
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 At the time Tineo was born, the only way a child could 
be legitimated in the Dominican Republic was through the 
marriage of the parents prior to the child’s sixteenth birthday.  
New York also required marriage of the parents in order to 
legitimate a child.  Tineo attempted to establish that his 
parents, who were never legally married, had a common law 
marriage.  He provided a letter from the Dominican Republic 
consulate, noting that “common-law marriage is recognized by 
our Supreme Court through a judgment dated October 17, 
2001, in the case of a lawsuit against an insurance company 
due to the death of a partner.”  App. 11, A.R. 943.  However, 
there was no evidence that this decision was retroactive such 
that it would apply to prior unions.  The IJ thus determined that 
Tineo’s parents did not have a common law marriage at the 
relevant time.   
 The Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) affirmed 
the IJ’s decision.  It found “no clear error in the Immigration 
Judge’s factual finding that the respondent has not presented 
evidence of legitimization . . . , such that he has not established 
that he was a ‘child’ for purposes of deriving citizenship 
through his father.”  App. 6.  Tineo argued that the definition 
of “child” “creates an unconstitutional gender-based 
distinction between mothers and fathers, in violation of the 
equal protection clause of the Constitution.”  Id.  But the BIA 
concluded that it lacked “jurisdiction to entertain such a 
challenge.”  Id. 
 
                                                 
Eligibility of Unlegitimated Children for Derivative 
Citizenship, 27 O.L.C. 136 (2003). 
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2.  
 Tineo further argued that the IJ erred in not finding that 
he was a U.S. citizen based on the issuance of his first passport.  
Relying on Delmore v. Brownell, 236 F.2d 598 (3d Cir. 1956), 
Matter of Villanueva, 19 I. & N. Dec. 101 (BIA 1984), and 
Matter of Peralta, 10 I. & N. Dec. 43 (BIA 1962), Tineo’s view 
was “that unless it is void on its face, a valid United States 
passport issued to an individual as a citizen of the United States 
is not subject to collateral attack in administrative immigration 
proceedings, but constitutes conclusive proof of such person’s 
[U.S.] citizenship.”  App. 5.  The BIA rejected this argument, 
based on new precedent from this Court in United States v. 
Moreno, 727 F.3d 255 (3d Cir. 2013).  In Moreno, we held that 
“a passport constitutes conclusive proof of citizenship only if 
the passport was issued to a U.S. citizen.”  Id. at 257.9     
D. Petition for Review and Motion to Remand 
 Tineo filed a timely petition for review with this Court.  
In lieu of filing a brief, the government moved to remand to 
allow the BIA “to provide a more fulsome explanation as to 
what weight should be afforded a previously-valid, but expired 
passport in establishing citizenship.”  Mot. to Remand 1.  The 
case was then stayed, pending the decision in Sessions v. 
                                                 
 9 We also note that our precedent in Delmore did not 
hold that a passport was conclusive proof of citizenship.  
Rather, we stated that “[o]nce the United States has determined 
that an individual is a citizen, it should be required to disprove 
its own determination by clear, unequivocal, and convincing 
evidence.”  Delmore, 236 F.2d at 600 (internal quotation marks 
omitted).   
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Morales-Santana, 137 S. Ct. 1678 (2017).  Upon issuance of 
the Supreme Court’s decision, Tineo filed a new opening brief, 
to which the government replied.  In its brief, the government 
noted that it no longer believed remand was necessary since the 
only issues presented involved legal questions, which this 
Court could address without input from the BIA.  In light of 
this admission, we deny the motion to remand.   
II. Jurisdiction and Standard/Scope of Review 
 
A. Jurisdiction 
 We have jurisdiction to decide a nationality claim under 
8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(5)(A), since “no genuine [dispute] of 
material fact about the petitioner’s nationality is presented.”  
Dessouki, 915 F.3d at 966–67 (affirming that “§ 1252(b)(5)(A) 
is best read as granting jurisdiction”).  We also have 
jurisdiction to review constitutional claims under § 
1252(a)(2)(D).   
 That Tineo’s claim is premised on his father’s 
constitutional rights is of no moment.  Typically, a party has to 
assert his own legal rights and cannot rely on the legal rights 
of third parties.  Morales-Santana, 137 S.Ct. at 1689.  But, as 
the Supreme Court articulated,  
we recognize an exception where, as here, the 
party asserting the right has a close relationship 
with the person who possesses the right [and] 
there is a hindrance to the possessor’s ability to 
protect his own interests.  
Id. (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted) 
(quoting Kowalski v. Tesmer, 543 U.S. 125, 130 (2004)).  As 
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Felipe Tineo’s son, Tineo satisfies the “close relationship” 
requirement, while his father’s death establishes the hindrance 
to his father’s ability to assert this claim on his own.  See id. 
(considering the petitioner-child as the “obvious claimant” and 
“best available proponent” of the equal protection rights of his 
deceased father whose “failure to assert a claim in his own right 
stem[med] from disability, not disinterest (internal quotation 
marks and citations omitted)); see also Breyer v. Meissner, 214 
F.3d 416, 423 (3d Cir. 2000) (holding that the petitioner could 
assert his mother’s equal protection rights because “his own 
alleged deprivation of citizenship as a result of discrimination 
against his mother constitute[d] injury-in-fact, the closeness of 
his relationship to his mother [was] obvious, and his mother’s 
death most definitely constitute[d] a hindrance to her assertion 
of her own rights”).   
B. Standard and Scope of Review 
 Though he asks us to employ any number of 
mechanisms to cure the constitutional infirmity he asserts, 
Tineo’s challenge remains that, in conjunction with the 
government’s construction of “child,” as defined in § 
1101(c)(1), and the prior legitimation laws of New York and 
the Dominican Republic, §§ 1432(a)(2) and (a)(3) prohibited a 
father from transmitting his citizenship to his born-out-of-
wedlock child in his care when the child’s mother was 
deceased, while allowing similarly situated mothers to so 
transmit.  Appellant’s Op. Br. 48.  Tineo’s is thus a challenge 
to a citizenship-determining “legislation that differentiate[d] 
on the basis of gender,” Morales-Santana, 137 S. Ct. at 1690, 
and that did so in an allegedly unconstitutional manner in his 
case.   
1.  
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 The standard of review for such a challenge is 
intermediate scrutiny.  That is, the legislation will only 
withstand constitutional scrutiny if its defender shows “at least 
that the challenged classification serves important 
governmental objectives and that the discriminatory means 
employed are substantially related to the achievement of those 
objectives.”  Id. (internal quotation marks and citations 
omitted).   
 This is not merely because the legislation differentiates 
on the basis of gender.  Indeed, because of Congress’s “broad 
power to admit or exclude [noncitizens],” statutes governing 
immigration benefits to noncitizens need only be supported by 
a rational basis, even where they differentiate on the basis of 
gender.  See Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 788–89, 792–96 
(1977).  Rather, it is also because, as was the case in Morales-
Santana, Tineo claims that “he is” and has for some time been 
“a U.S. citizen.”  See Morales-Santana, 137 S. Ct. at 1693–94 
(applying an “exacting standard of review” to “a claim of th[e 
same] order”); see also Dent v. Sessions, 900 F.3d 1075, 1081 
(9th Cir. 2018) (overturning prior ruling that rational basis 
review applied even where the relevant statute governs who is 
and is not a citizen in light of Morales-Santana).  The 
government concedes as much.  See Resp’t Br. 33.   
 Similar to the Ninth Circuit, we previously assessed 
whether “[f]ormer 8 U.S.C. § 1432’s restrictions on derivative 
citizenship based solely on the father’s naturalization [were] 
rationally related” to the reasons proffered by the government.  
Catwell v. Att’y Gen. of U.S., 623 F.3d 199, 211 (3d Cir. 2010) 
(emphasis added).  Catwell did involve the slightly different 
circumstance of a noncitizen challenging a citizenship-
conferring statute on his own behalf, id. at 210 (“Petitioner 
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contends that former 8 U.S.C. § 1432(a)(3) ‘unconstitutionally 
discriminates against [him] based upon legitimacy and 
gender.’”) (quoting Catwell’s Br. 53).  That is enough to 
distinguish it from Breyer, which applied intermediate scrutiny 
where a noncitizen presented a gender-based equal protection 
challenge to a citizenship-conferring statute because the 
challenge was on behalf of his citizen parent.  214 F.3d at 423–
24.  But not from Morales-Santana.  This is because, unlike 
Breyer, there is no indication that Morales-Santana’s 
application of intermediate scrutiny was premised on anything 
other than the fact that the petitioner’s challenge was gender-
based and he “claim[ed] he [was] . . . a U.S. citizen.”  137 S. 
Ct. at 1693–94.   
 So we too must relent:  in accordance with United States 
v. Tann, 577 F.3d 533, 541 (3d Cir. 2009), based on intervening 
Supreme Court precedent, this panel declines to follow our 
Court’s precedential decision in Catwell.  We will apply 
intermediate scrutiny in this case and do so because Tineo 
presents a gender-based equal protection challenge and claims 
that he is a U.S. citizen. 
2.  
 The scope of the challenge is as-applied.  This entails a 
concession that the statute at issue may be constitutional in 
many of its applications but contends “that its application to a 
particular person under particular circumstances deprived that 
person of a constitutional right.”  United States v. Marcavage, 
609 F.3d 264, 273 (3d Cir. 2010) (citation omitted).  In 
contrast, a facial challenge “tests a law’s constitutionality 
based on its text alone and does not consider the facts or 
circumstances of a particular case.”  Id. (citation omitted).  
Properly understood, Tineo’s challenge turns on the particular 
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circumstances at hand:  the statute’s interaction with the New 
York and Dominican Republic laws and his particular family 
circumstances.   
 By contrast, many jurisdictions have abolished 
distinctions between legitimated and unlegitimated children or 
eased the burden on unwed fathers to legitimate their children.  
See, e.g., Brandao v. Att’y Gen. of U.S., 654 F.3d 427, 430 (3d 
Cir. 2011) (abolished in Cape Verde); Anderson v. Holder, 673 
F.3d 1089, 1101–02 (9th Cir. 2012) (eased in Arizona).  
Indeed, in 2015, the BIA observed the “growing consensus—
both in the United States and abroad—against labeling children 
[]‘legitimate’ and ‘illegitimate’ by virtue of the marital status 
of their parents.”  Matter of Cross, 26 I. & N. Dec. 485, 492 
(BIA 2015).  So it eased the burden on unwed fathers in some 
jurisdictions by holding that, for the purposes of § 1101(c)(1), 
a father need not follow the formal process required to 
legitimate a child if that jurisdiction has eliminated all legal 
distinctions between “legitimate” and “illegitimate” children.  
Id.10  Additionally, as the government points out, as early as 
1940, nearly half of all states permitted a father to take some 
action other than marrying the child’s mother in order to 
legitimate a child born out of wedlock.  Resp’t Br. 41 (citing 
Nationality Manual § 1041.861).   
  
                                                 
 10 The burden still remains in jurisdictions that maintain 
the distinction, since § 1101(c)(1) has not been amended. 
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III. Discussion 
 
A. Challenge 
 Moving to the challenge itself, it is twofold.  Tineo first 
asks that we avoid the constitutional question by rejecting the 
government’s construction of “child,” as defined in 8 U.S.C. § 
1101(c)(1), and instead construe the provision as including 
anyone who is unmarried and under the age of 21.  
Alternatively, he asks that we deem the interplay between §§ 
1101(c)(1) and 1432(a) unconstitutional as applied to his 
father.  
1.  
 Section 1101(c)(1) is the linchpin of the denial of 
Tineo’s constitutional avoidance argument.  This is because § 
1101(c)(1) has been interpreted to require that a child born out 
of wedlock must be legitimated in order to be considered a 
“child” as incorporated in § 1432(a).  So read, it tethers 
legitimation to the law of the residence or domicile of the father 
or child.  In the context of laws that only permit legitimation 
through marriage, then, § 1101(c)(1) causes § 1432(a)(2) to 
prevent a surviving father from ever transmitting citizenship to 
his child “if the child remained unlegitimated at the time of the 
mother’s death.”  Pet’r’s Op. Br. 16.   Further, “[t]he father 
would be powerless to change this result by adopting or 
legitimating the child, since adoption is unavailable to 
biological fathers . . . .”  Id. at 19–20.  In contrast, a naturalized 
mother may transmit citizenship to her “child [who] was born 
out of wedlock and [whose] paternity . . . has not been 
established by legitimation.”  § 1432(a)(3).   
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 We agree that the government’s construction of § 
1101(c)(1) plays a role in the alleged constitutional violation, 
but pinning it all on that provision in the way Tineo proposes 
would be strong medicine for what is an otherwise narrow 
infirmity.   
 Under the government’s construction, § 1101(c)(1) 
merely imposes a legitimation requirement on the fathers of 
children born out of wedlock.  While this imposition engenders 
a differentiation between women and men, it is akin to gender-
based differentiation that has withstood constitutional scrutiny.  
Indeed, in Nguyen, the Supreme Court upheld imposing 
affirmative steps, including legitimation, on unwed fathers but 
not mothers so long as they were not “onerous” and did not 
create “inordinate and unnecessary hurdles to conferral of 
citizenship on the children of citizen fathers.”  Nguyen, 533 
U.S. at 62, 65, 70–71.  This is because the relation between a 
mother and a child “is verifiable from the birth itself,” and the 
same is true of “the opportunity for the development of a 
relationship between citizen parent and child  . . . .”  Id. at 62, 
65.  These same biological differences led the Court to opine 
in Trimble that “[t]he more serious problems of proving 
paternity might justify a more demanding standard for 
illegitimate children claiming under their fathers’ estates than 
that required for [those] claiming under their mothers’ estates . 
. . .”  430 U.S. at 771 (emphasis added).   
 Assuming arguendo that we would be able to, 
construing § 1101(c)(1) in the way Tineo proposes would 
effectively invalidate the legitimation requirement in most 
instances.  Rather than applying in every case in which a child 
is born out of wedlock and only the father naturalizes, the 
requirement would only apply where this was true and the out-
of-wedlock child married or was over the age of 21.  When 
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coupled with the requirement that the parent’s naturalization 
needs to happen while the child is under eighteen years of age, 
see § 1432(a)(4), the requirement would become a shell of its 
former self.  This effect is even broader when one considers 
that § 1101(c)(1) continues to play a role in the renewed § 
1431(a), which also requires that the child be “under the age of 
eighteen years” when the parent naturalizes.  § 1431(a)(2).    
 Regardless of the merits (or lack thereof) of imposing a 
legitimation requirement on the fathers of children born out of 
wedlock, invalidating a provision’s operation in a vast number 
of instances across two different statutes, one of which is not 
at issue, is too strong a medicine for avoiding or curing the 
otherwise narrow infirmity Tineo has identified.  Tineo’s father 
was unable to have his born-out-of-wedlock child derive 
citizenship through him, whereas a similarly situated mother 
would have faced no such roadblock.  Though § 1101(c)(1) sets 
the stage for this disparate treatment, § 1432(a)(2) and (a)(3) 
are the main acts.  We therefore consider the infirmity alleged 
by Tineo, with due attention to how the provisions operate in 
concert. 
2.  
 As we have noted in prior cases, “the standard of review 
. . . is often outcome determinative.”  Connelly v. Steel Valley 
Sch. Dist., 706 F.3d 209, 213 (3d Cir. 2013).  This case is no 
different.  To survive the challenge Tineo presents, the 
government is required to show that §§ 1101(c)(1) and 
1432(a)’s classification “serve an important governmental 
interest today.”  Morales-Santana, 137 S. Ct. at 1690.  This is 
because, “in interpreting the Equal Protection Clause, the 
[Supreme] Court has recognized that new insights and societal 
understandings can reveal unjustified inequality . . . that once 
 23 
 
passed unnoticed and unchallenged.”  Obergefell v. Hodges, 
135 S. Ct. 2584, 2603 (2015) (quoted in Morales-Santana, 137 
S. Ct. at 1690).  This is a tall order for the government, as it 
requires justifying treating Tineo’s father as being so different 
from a similarly situated mother of an out-of-wedlock child 
that Tineo’s father ought to never be able to transmit his 
citizenship to Tineo.   
 Unsurprisingly, the order is too tall:  the government’s 
justification is unavailing in these circumstances.  
 It proffers that the classification is a tailored means by 
Congress to avoid “usurping the traditional province of states, 
and foreign countries, to regulate domestic relationships.”  
Resp’t Br. 35–36, 38.  In essence, Congress wanted to “defer 
to states’ laws on legitimacy” that “did not permit a[n 
unlegitimated] child to inherit from his . . . father.”  Id. at 40.  
This justification is tantamount to asserting that the federal 
government has an important interest in perpetuating 
discrimination under state or foreign law against the fathers of 
nonmarital children, a premise that is at odds with Supreme 
Court precedent.  See Morales-Santana, 137 S. Ct. at 1700 
n.25.  As the Court observed, “[d]istinctions based on parents’ 
marital status . . . are subject to the same heightened scrutiny 
as distinctions based on gender.”  Id.; cf. Cabrera v. Att’y Gen. 
of U.S., 921 F.3d 401, 404 (3d Cir. 2019) (applying rational 
basis review to disparate treatment of biological and adoptive 
children in the context of 8 U.S.C. § 1409).  Permitting the 
government to impose one dubious classification merely to 
entrench another would be absurd. 
 Even if this interest did not equate to the perpetuation 
of discrimination against unwed fathers, the government has 
not articulated how deferring to state legitimation rules 
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constitutes an important governmental interest “today.”  See id. 
at 1690.  Although some states have not formally abolished the 
distinction between legitimated and unlegitimated children, 
these classifications now have little import under state law:  
long gone are the days when unlegitimated children simply 
could not inherit. See, e.g., N.Y. Est. Powers & Trs. Law § 4-
1.2(2)(C) (allowing unlegitimated children to inherit if they 
provide results from a paternity test or “evidence that the father 
openly and notoriously acknowledged the child as his own”).  
But, when coupled with the circumstances of Tineo’s case, §§ 
1101(c)(1) and 1432(a)’s legitimation rule turns these largely 
meaningless vestiges of a bygone era into the defining 
characteristic for whether naturalized fathers can ever transmit 
citizenship to their born-out-of-wedlock children.    
 Our dissenting colleague would like us to cast this 
reality aside because, “in legislating, Congress is not required 
to anticipate every potential outcome that results from the 
application of a statute in order for it to pass constitutional 
muster.”  Diss. Op. 5.11  The view originates from a passage in 
                                                 
 11 To be clear, our colleague is not suggesting that 
Congress need not consider the Constitution when legislating.  
This proposition finds no support in our jurisprudence, the 
Supreme Court’s, or that of any of our sister circuits.  It is 
elemental that Congress cannot legislate beyond the limits set 
by the Constitution.  Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 138 
(1803) (“An act of congress repugnant to the constitution 
cannot become law.” (emphasis added)).  So, while it may well 
be true that Congress is not required to anticipate every 
potential outcome that results from the application of its 
statutes, we are obliged to hold it accountable for those 
applications that are unconstitutional.  See, e.g., id. at 177–78 
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Nguyen.  The Court had acknowledged the importance of 
assuring the existence of a relationship between citizen parent 
and child, both as a biological matter and in terms of the 
opportunity for a true relationship to develop between the two.  
Nguyen, 533 U.S. at 62, 65 (acknowledging that the biological 
relationship between a mother and child is “verifiable from the 
birth itself,” and “likewise the opportunity for the development 
of a relationship between citizen parent and child”).  In 
response, the “petitioners assert[ed] that, although a mother 
will know of her child’s birth, knowledge that one is a parent, 
no matter how it is acquired, does not guarantee a relationship 
with one’s child.”  Id. at 69.  The Court dismissed this assertion 
on the ground that, “even [if] one conceive[d] of the interest 
Congress pursue[d] as establishment of a real, practical 
relationship of considerable substance between parent and 
child in every case,” its chosen means would “meet[] the equal 
protection standard . . . so long as it is substantially related to 
the achievement of the governmental objective in question.”  
Id. at 70 (emphases added) (internal quotation marks and 
citations omitted).  It then clarified this point by explaining that 
the means-end fit required to survive intermediate scrutiny 
does not require that the means be “capable of achieving [the] 
ultimate objective in every instance.”  Id.   
 With this as the background, there is no disagreement 
that the existence of a relationship between citizen parent and 
child is an important governmental objective, particularly in 
the “difficult context of conferring citizenship on a vast 
                                                 
(“[I]f a law be in opposition to the constitution [and] both the 
law and the constitution apply to a particular case, . . . the court 
must determine which of these conflicting rules governs the 
case.  This is of the very essence of judicial duty.”). 
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number of persons.”  Id. at 70.  We also agree that the means-
end fit required to survive intermediate scrutiny does not mean 
that 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101(c)(1) and 1432(a)(2) and (a)(3) have to 
ensure that this relationship exists in every instance.  But Tineo 
does not contend otherwise:  he simply asks us to determine 
whether the means-end fit was sufficiently close when those 
provisions did not permit his father to transmit citizenship to 
him, without providing any practicable way for his father to 
demonstrate that the requisite relationship existed between the 
two. 
 To that effect, the Supreme Court has long recognized 
that “laws treating fathers and mothers differently may not be 
constitutionally applied . . . where the mother and father are in 
fact similarly situated with regard to their relationship with the 
child.”  Morales-Santana, 137 S. Ct. at 1693 n. 12 (2017) 
(alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted) 
(quoting Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 267 (1983)).  It thus 
saw no equal protection problem where an unwed father who 
“ha[d] never supported and rarely seen” his child complained 
that he was entitled to receive notice of a proceeding to adopt 
her.  Lehr, 463 U.S. at 250.  The Court concluded that “the New 
York statutes adequately protected appellant’s inchoate 
interest in establishing a relationship with [his daughter],” and 
thus found “no merit in the claim that his constitutional rights 
were offended.”  Id. at 262–65; see also Morales-Santana, 137 
S. Ct. at 1693 n.12 (explaining that “[t]he ‘similarly situated’ 
condition was not satisfied in Lehr, [because] the father in that 
case had ‘never established any custodial, personal, or 
financial relationship’ with the child”).  Notably, the statutes 
provided that the father would have been entitled to notice had 
he done any one of the following:  (1) filed his name in the 
state’s putative father registry, (2) established paternity by 
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adjudication, (3) been identified as the child’s father on her 
birth certificate, (4) openly lived with the child’s mother and 
held himself out to be her father, (5) identified as the father in 
a sworn statement, or (6) married the child’s mother before she 
turned six months old.  Id. at 251.   
 Tellingly, the Court took the opposite view with an 
Illinois statute that outright terminated the custody rights of an 
unwed father who had “lived with his children all their lives 
and had lived with their mother for eighteen years,” and 
thereby rendered “the nature of the actual relationship between 
parent and child . . . completely irrelevant.”  Lehr, 463 U.S. at 
258–59. (emphasis added) (referring to Stanley v. Illinois, 405 
U.S. 645, 655 (1972)).  Specifically, the statute permitted the 
state to “circumvent neglect proceedings on the theory that an 
unwed father [was] not a ‘parent’ whose existing relationship 
with his children must be considered.”  Stanley, 405 U.S. at 
649–50.  As the Court put it, such a law “conclusively 
presumed every father of a child born out of wedlock to be an 
unfit person to have custody of his children.”  Lehr, 463 U.S. 
at 258 (emphasis added).  The Court found this 
“constitutionally repugnant,” because even if “most unmarried 
fathers are unsuitable and neglectful parents . . . some are 
wholly suited to have custody of their children,” and the “State 
readily concede[d]” that there was no evidence that the father 
“[was] or ha[d] been a neglectful father who ha[d] not cared 
for his children.”  Stanley, 405 U.S. at 649, 654–55. 
 Nothing in Nguyen suggests that the Court has departed 
from this course.  Like the New York statutes in Lehr, 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1409(a)(4) imposed what the Court characterized as a 
“minimal” burden on unwed fathers to demonstrate the 
existence of a relationship with their child as a prerequisite for 
transmitting citizenship.  Nguyen, 633 U.S. at 70.  The father 
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could take the “least onerous of . . . the[] simple steps and 
alternatives” of legitimating the child under the law of the 
child’s residence or domicile, acknowledging paternity in 
writing under oath, or establishing paternity by adjudication of 
a competent court.  Id. at 59, 69–71 (emphases added).  In 
contrast, the burden imposed on Tineo’s father to demonstrate 
the existence of a relationship to Tineo was not only onerous, 
it was impossible.  Indeed, like Stanley, the actual relationship 
between Felipe Tineo and his child was rendered completely 
irrelevant, and he was conclusively presumed to be unfit to 
transmit citizenship to his child. 
 We thus maintain that, when applied to his 
circumstance, the provisions from which such a burden and 
presumption stem—§§ 1101(c)(1) and 1432(a)(2) and (a)(3)—
cannot be squared with the equal-protection mandate of the 
Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.   
B. Remedy 
 Anticipating this result, the government suggests that 
we “should not fashion a remedy and, instead, leave that work 
to Congress.”  Resp’t Br. 48.  In so suggesting, the government 
advances the view that we do not have the “power to provide 
relief of the sort requested in this [petition]—namely, conferral 
of citizenship on a basis other than that prescribed by 
Congress.”  Morales-Santana, 137 S. Ct. at 1701 (Thomas, J., 
joined by Alito, J., concurring in part) (internal quotation 
marks and citations omitted).  We do not subscribe to this view.  
See Breyer, 214 F.3d at 429 (finding an equal protection 
violation in a derivative citizenship statute, and providing that, 
pursuant to additional findings by the District Court, the 
noncitizen petitioner would “be entitled to American 
citizenship relating back to his birth”).    
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 As an initial matter, a judgment in Tineo’s favor “would 
confirm [his] pre-existing citizenship rather than grant [him] 
rights that [he] does not now possess.”  Miller v. Albright, 523 
U.S. 420, 432 (1998) (opinion of Stevens, J.).  Or, more 
precisely, what Tineo seeks is “severance of the offending 
provisions so that the statute, free of its constitutional defect, 
can operate to determine whether citizenship was transmitted” 
by his father.  Nguyen, 533 U.S. at 95–96 (O’Connor, J., 
dissenting) (citing Miller, 523 U.S. at 488–89) (Breyer, J., 
dissenting)); Oral Arg. Audio 9:38–10:04.  Indeed, as long ago 
as 1898, the Supreme Court invalidated the application of the 
Chinese Exclusion Act to a man born in the United States and 
who therefore, under the Fourteenth Amendment, had been a 
citizen since birth.  See United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 
U.S. 649, 704 (1898). 
 More to the point, the view espoused by the government 
has never commanded a majority of the Supreme Court, and, 
in fact, as the authoring Justice Scalia bemoaned, “[a] majority 
of the Justices . . . concluded otherwise in” Miller and “the 
Court . . . proceed[ed] on the same assumption” in Nguyen.  
Nguyen, 533 U.S. at 73–74 (Scalia, J., joined by Thomas, J., 
concurring) (concluding that it was thus “appropriate . . . to 
reach the merits of petitioners’ equal protection claims [and] 
join the opinion of the Court”).   
 The principal case cited by the government—INS v. 
Pangilinan, 486 U.S. 875, 883 (1988)—does not convince us 
otherwise.  That case involved the judicial conferral of 
citizenship as an equitable remedy where there was no finding 
that the statute was constitutionally infirm.  Section 701 of the 
1940 Nationality Act provided an avenue by which noncitizens 
who served in World War II could naturalize without having to 
meet a residency or English-proficiency requirement.  Id. at 
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877–88.  That pathway presumed that a representative would 
be designated to receive petitions, conduct hearings, and grant 
naturalizations overseas.  Id. at 878.  For foreign-policy 
reasons, the Attorney General deprived the Philippine Islands 
of such a representative for a nine-month period.  Id. at 879–
80.  This led to a stream of litigation by Filipino veterans who 
did not naturalize before the 1940 Act expired.  Id. at 880.  Two 
cases made it to the Ninth Circuit and were consolidated.  Id.  
The Ninth Circuit held that the deprivation of a representative 
in the Philippines violated the mandate of the 1940 Act and 
awarded an equitable remedy by retroactively conferring 
citizenship.  Id. at 882.  The Supreme Court reversed because,  
like the doctrine of equitable estoppel, equitable remedies 
cannot “override a public policy established by Congress . . . .”  
Id. at 883 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).  That 
is, “the power to make someone a citizen of the United States 
has not been conferred upon the federal courts, like mandamus 
or injunction, as one of their generally applicable equitable 
powers.”  Id. at 883–84 (emphasis added). 
 That statement and holding have no bearing where the 
Constitution is concerned.  See Nguyen, 523 U.S. at 95–96 
(O’Connor, J., joined by Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer, JJ., 
dissenting).  In that instance, the notion that a court is not 
empowered to fashion a remedy finds support in only an 
exceedingly strict view of the plenary power doctrine.  See 
Miller, 523 U.S. at 455–56 (Scalia, J., concurring in the 
judgment) (“It is in my view incompatible with the plenary 
power of Congress over those fields for judges to speculate as 
to what Congress would have enacted if it had not enacted what 
it did . . . .”).  It was not too long ago that a similarly strict 
treatment of this doctrine resulted in the condonation of even 
the most blatant discrimination.  See, e.g., The Chinese 
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Exclusion Case, 130 U.S. 581, 610–11 (1889) (establishing the 
modern plenary-power doctrine in upholding the Chinese 
Exclusion Act); Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 
732, 13 S. Ct. 1016, 1017 (1893) (holding that the political 
branches could deport residents based solely on their race and 
deem all people of “the Chinese race” incompetent to sign the 
affidavit needed for Chinese immigrants to remain lawfully); 
id. at 763 (Fuller, J., dissenting) (castigating the majority’s 
decision as “incompatible with the immutable principles of 
justice, inconsistent with the nature of our government, and in 
conflict with the written constitution by which that government 
was created, and those principles secured”); Boutilier v. INS, 
387 U.S. 118, 122–24 (1967) (holding that Congress could 
deem gay men excludable “as afflicted with a . . . psychopathic 
personality” under the plenary-power doctrine). 
 Unsurprisingly, then, while continuing to recognize the 
broad deference owed to Congress in immigration matters, the 
Supreme Court has in recent years curtailed the plenary-power 
doctrine’s excesses, both by clarifying that rational-basis 
review still adheres upon its invocation and by limiting the 
classes of persons subject thereto.  See, e.g., Morales-Santana, 
137 S. Ct. at 1693–94; INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 940–41 
(1983) (rejecting the government’s invocation of the plenary-
power doctrine because the case concerned “whether Congress 
has chosen a constitutionally permissible means of 
implementing that power”).  We, too, have recognized that the 
plenary-power doctrine—while affording Congress great 
discretion—“is subject to important constitutional limitations,” 
and “it is the province of the courts” to enforce those 
constraints.  Osorio-Martinez v. Att’y Gen. of U.S., 893 F.3d 
153, 175 (3d Cir. 2018) (quoting Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 
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678, 695 (2001)) (holding that children with special immigrant 
juvenile status may invoke the Suspension Clause). 
 That curtailment is further apparent from the Court’s 
remedy analysis in Morales-Santana.  After finding an 
unconstitutional infirmity with the provisions at issue, the 
Court engaged in precisely the sort of “speculat[ion] as to what 
Congress would have enacted if it had not enacted what it did” 
Justice Scalia cautioned against in his concurrence in Miller.  
The equal protection infirmity at issue was that the statute 
retained a longer physical-presence requirement for unwed 
citizen fathers to transmit citizenship to their children born 
abroad to a noncitizen mother than for similarly situated unwed 
citizen mothers.  Morales-Santana, 137 S. Ct. at 1698.  The 
petitioner asked the Court to extend the benefit of the shorter 
physical-presence requirement to the unwed fathers that the 
statute reserved for the unwed mothers.  Id.  The Court 
expressly stated that it had the option of doing just that or 
nullifying the benefit reserved for the unwed mothers such that 
both classes of parents would have a longer physical presence 
requirement.  Id.  Despite acknowledging that “extension, 
rather than nullification, is the proper course” it chose 
nullification because extension would have disrupted the 
statutory scheme in a way that would have meant a shorter 
physical-presence requirement for unwed fathers and mothers 
than for their wed counterparts.  Id. at 1700.  
 To our case, then, the “proper course” is proper.  Indeed, 
we are confronted with the same two remedial alternatives:  we 
can remedy the unequal treatment by extending the benefit that 
8 U.S.C. § 1432(a)(3) confers on unwed mothers to Felipe 
Tineo or by nullifying the benefit such that the benefit-
conferring clause in (a)(3) is excised.  We choose the former, 
and our choice is “governed by the legislature’s intent, as 
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revealed by the statute at hand.”  Morales-Santana, 137 S. Ct. 
at 1699.   
 Gleaning that the proper course is extension is rather 
straightforward in this case.  On the one hand, nothing supports 
nullification.  This is because in the face of nullification—that 
is, the possibility that § 1101(c)(1) could be read as imposing 
a legitimation requirement on mothers of children born out of 
wedlock—Congress spoke in as clear a manner as it could.  It 
said “a child born outside of the United States of [noncitizen 
parents] . . . becomes a citizen [upon the] . . . the naturalization 
of the mother if the child was born out of wedlock and the 
paternity of the child has not been established by legitimation 
. . . .”  § 1432(a)(3).  Even in the absence of this provision, the 
government has maintained that no such legitimation 
requirement exists for mothers.  See Eligibility of 
Unlegitimated Children for Derivative Citizenship, 27 O.L.C. 
136 (2003); Memorandum of William Yates, Acting Assoc. 
Dir., CIS, to Regional Directors, CIS (Sept. 26, 2003), 2003 
WL 22334606, at *1.  
 On the other, there is no roadblock to granting 
extension.  There is little support for the view that Congress 
intended that no unlegitimated child born out of wedlock 
would ever derive citizenship through her father.  Even if it did, 
its enactment of a severability provision counsels against 
considering that conviction as so strong as to warrant depriving 
similarly situated mothers of the benefit in order to implement 
it.  See The Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 § 406, 66 
Stat. 163, 281 (“If any particular provision of this Act, or the 
application thereof to any person or circumstance, is held 
invalid, the remainder of the Act and the application of such 
provision to other persons or circumstances shall not be 
affected thereby.” (emphases added)).   
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 In addition, contrary to the government’s suggestion, 
Morales-Santana is no obstacle.  The Court’s reluctance to 
grant extension in Morales-Santana was driven by the fact that 
it would result in ascribing a discriminatory intent to Congress:  
that of “disadvantageous treatment of marital children in 
comparison to nonmarital children.”  137 S. Ct. at 1700.  There 
is no argument that § 1101(c)(1)’s legitimation requirement 
applies, or has ever applied, to the parents of children born in 
wedlock.  Thus, extending Felipe Tineo the same treatment that 
§ 1432(a)(3) affords to similarly situated mothers would not 
disrupt the statutory scheme in any significant way, nor will it 
result in ascribing a discriminatory intent to Congress.   
 So we will:  Jose Francisco Tineo became a U.S. citizen 
when his father naturalized and he was “under the age of 
eighteen years” and “residing in the United States pursuant to 
a lawful admission for permanent residence . . . .”  See § 
1432(a)(4) & (a)(5).  That is since June 15, 1985.   
* * * * * 
 We acknowledge that, like Morales-Santana before 
him, Tineo does not engender much sympathy.  He had other 
options available to seek citizenship in his own right.  See, e.g., 
8 U.S.C. § 1427.  Although “[t]his option [might have] be[en] 
foreclosed to [Tineo], [] any bar [would have been] due to the 
serious nature of his criminal offenses, not to an equal 
protection denial or to any supposed rigidity or harshness in the 
citizenship laws.”  Nguyen, 533 U.S. at 71.   
 But he is not the Tineo that is our focus here.  The result 
fostered by the gender classification at issue precluded Felipe 
Tineo from ever having his child derive citizenship from him.  
No matter how we attain it, the Constitution guarantees us the 
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rights and responsibilities that come with American 
citizenship, regardless of gender, religious beliefs, or the color 
of our skin.  See J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 
146 (1994).  Felipe Tineo acquired citizenship and lived out its 
responsibilities, so we cannot lend our imprimatur to his being 
unconstitutionally denied one of its benefits.  This is the focus 
of Jose Tineo’s challenge, and the lens through which we view 
him an American. 
 With this ruling, the consequence for Tineo’s offenses 
is not removal, but rather what the law provides is permissible 
for any other citizen who is convicted of the same offenses.  
We will therefore grant the petition for review and vacate the 
order of removal.  This course obviates the need to reach 
Tineo’s argument that the BIA should have found that his 
passport established a presumption of citizenship that the 
government may rebut only by showing that the passport was 
fraudulently or illegally obtained.  See Dessouki, 915 F.3d at 
967 (citizenship finding mooted “lingering agency issues”). 
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SMITH, Chief Judge, concurring in part and dissenting in 
part. 
 When Felipe Tineo became a naturalized United 
States citizen, he acquired all the rights that adhere to that 
status.  At the relevant time, this included the right to pass 
his citizenship to his children under the circumstances 
described in 8 U.S.C. § 1432.1  Because we address the 
claim that Felipe Tineo would have been able to pass his 
citizenship to his son José pursuant to § 1432 but for a 
gender-based classification preventing it, I concur with the 
majority that we apply intermediate scrutiny in conducting 
our review.2  Sessions v. Morales-Santana, 137 S. Ct. 
1678, 1689 (2017).  Intermediate scrutiny requires that the 
                                           
1 For simplicity, I refer only to § 1432.  However, as the 
majority correctly observes, the gender-based 
classification at issue arises from the interaction of two 
subsections of § 1432 with the definition of “child” in 8 
U.S.C. § 1101(c)(1). 
 
2 I likewise concur with the majority in its view that, to the 
extent Catwell v. Attorney General, 623 F.3d 199, 211 (3d 
Cir. 2010), applied rational basis review to a gender-based 
equal protection challenge, we must decline to follow it in 
light of the Supreme Court’s more recent decision in 
Sessions v. Morales-Santana, 137 S. Ct. 1678, 1689 
(2017). 
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gender-based classification serve an important 
governmental objective and be substantially related to 
achievement of that objective.  Id. at 1690.  I part ways 
with the majority because, in my view, § 1432 satisfies 
that standard.3 
The Government posits that § 1432 serves an 
important governmental objective: as in Nguyen v. INS, 
533 U.S. 53 (2001), the statute utilizes legitimation “as a 
tailored means of ensuring that only those unwed fathers 
who had achieved equal parental rights as those afforded 
to mothers under the law of their state or country were 
permitted to pass citizenship to their child.”  Resp’t. Br. 
35–36.   
Recently, in Morales-Santana, the Supreme Court 
reaffirmed that it correctly decided Nguyen.  In Nguyen, 
the parental acknowledgement requirement served the 
important interest of establishing “the parent’s filial tie to 
the child.”  Morales-Santana, 137 S. Ct. at 1694.  The 
Supreme Court described the parental acknowledgement 
requirement as “a justifiable, easily met means of ensuring 
the existence of a biological parent-child relationship, 
which the mother establishes by giving birth.”  Id.   
                                           
3 I further agree with the majority that, under United States 
v. Moreno, 727 F.3d 255, 257 (3d Cir. 2013), Tineo’s first 
passport does not constitute conclusive proof of 
citizenship. 
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Nguyen recognized two important interests that are 
served in establishing the existence of such a filial tie: (1) 
the importance of assuring the existence of a biological 
father-child relationship; and (2) the importance of 
developing a true interpersonal relationship between the 
child and the citizen parent who, in turn, has ties to the 
United States.  Nguyen, 533 U.S. at 62–65.  The 
differential treatment of mothers and fathers is based upon 
genuine differences at the time of the birth of a child, and 
does not rely on outdated stereotypes.  See Nguyen, 533 
U.S. at 68 (“There is nothing irrational or improper in the 
recognition that at the moment of birth . . . the mother’s 
knowledge of the child and the fact of parenthood have 
been established in a way not guaranteed in the case of the 
unwed father.  This is not a stereotype.”). 
The legitimation requirement in § 1432, like the 
parental acknowledgment requirement in Nguyen, is 
substantially related to the goal of ensuring that a 
naturalized father’s citizenship passes automatically to his 
child only in those cases where a genuine biological and 
familial tie exists.  “It is almost axiomatic that a policy 
which seeks to foster the opportunity for meaningful 
parent-child bonds to develop has a close and substantial 
bearing on the governmental interest in the actual 
formation of that bond.”  Nguyen, 533 U.S. at 70.  The fit 
between the means and the important end is, as in Nguyen, 
“exceedingly persuasive.”  Id.   
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Section 1432 is actually more difficult to satisfy 
than the statute in Nguyen because § 1432 is limited to 
legitimation under local law, while the statute in Nguyen 
permitted paternal acknowledgment via two additional 
methods (a court order of paternity or a declaration of 
paternity under oath).  See Nguyen, 533 U.S. at 70–71.  In 
my view, this does not change the conclusion that Nguyen 
applies.  Even if § 1432 had included the other alternatives 
described in Nguyen, none of them would be available to 
José Tineo because there is no evidence that his father 
acknowledged paternity or adjudicated paternity before 
José turned 18.  Moreover, as observed in Nguyen, José 
Tineo could have sought citizenship in his own right, were 
it not for his having committed serious criminal offenses.  
See Nguyen, 533 U.S. at 71.   
It need hardly be pointed out that we are not 
permitted to override the will of Congress and select other 
methods for designating the recipients of derivative 
citizenship.  Indeed, in Nguyen, the Supreme Court 
rejected the suggestion that a DNA test should suffice, 
observing that the “Constitution . . . does not require that 
Congress elect one particular mechanism from among 
many possible methods of establishing paternity.”  
Nguyen, 533 U.S. at 63.  Our review is limited to 
consideration of whether Congress’s selection of state 
legitimation law is substantially related to its goal of 
establishing the existence of a true filial tie before 
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citizenship may pass from a father to his non-marital child.  
As I see it, such a substantial relationship exists.   
The majority is swayed by the outcome that José 
Tineo is forever barred from receiving derivative 
citizenship via his naturalized father because his mother 
died when José was 15, and the laws of the relevant 
jurisdictions (New York and the Dominican Republic) 
offered no method for Felipe to legitimate José after her 
death.  For that reason, the majority dismisses the 
Government’s primary justification for the statute.  But in 
legislating, Congress is not required to anticipate every 
potential outcome that results from the application of a 
statute in order for it to pass constitutional muster.  See 
Pierre v. Holder, 738 F.3d 39, 53–54 (2d Cir. 2013).  
Congress legislated in the “difficult context of conferring 
citizenship on vast numbers of persons.” Nguyen, 533 U.S. 
at 70.  We should therefore accept the means Congress 
chose, so long as it does so within the bounds of the 
constitution by legislating “in substantial furtherance of 
important governmental objectives.”  See id.  I believe its 
chosen course meets that test.4    
                                           
4 In dismissing the government’s proffered justification, 
the majority relies on decisions about the termination of 
parental rights.  In Lehr v. Robinson, 463 U.S. 248, 266–
68 (1983), for instance, the Supreme Court upheld a New 
York law that prevented a biological father from vetoing 
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his daughter’s adoption by another man.  Lehr, in turn, 
cites Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380, 389 (1979), a 
case in which the Supreme Court rejected an earlier 
version of the same New York statute because it too 
broadly assumed that a father always has a lesser bond 
than a mother.  In Caban, the statute was structured in a 
way that did not take into account the father’s relationship 
with his biological child at all, and instead relied 
exclusively on “overbroad generalizations” about a non-
marital father’s role.  Id. at 394.  Thus, Caban concerned 
the sort of outdated gender stereotypes that do not underlie 
the legislation before us today.  And, after Caban, the New 
York legislature amended the statute to provide methods 
for an unwed father to establish the existence of a 
relationship with his child.  See Practice Commentary, 
N.Y. Dom. Rel. Law § 111 (McKinney 2016).  It was the 
amended statute that survived scrutiny in Lehr.   
 
Here, in contrast to Lehr and Caban, Congress was not 
addressing the termination of parental rights in adoption, 
but was legislating to ensure the existence of the father’s 
filial tie for the specific purpose of passing on a citizenship 
right.  The Supreme Court spoke to this important interest 
in Nguyen and upheld an analogous provision as 
constitutional because it substantially served that 
important interest.  Nguyen, 533 U.S. at 67.  In short, Lehr 
and Caban arose in a distinct and distinguishable context 
and do not undermine my conclusion that Nguyen controls. 
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Equal protection does not require that “the statute 
under consideration must be capable of achieving its 
ultimate objective in every instance.”  Id.  Thus, although 
the result in the case we confront is that José Tineo cannot 
acquire derivative citizenship under § 1432, such an 
outcome does not mean that his father was deprived of the 
equal protection of the law.   
I therefore would deny the petition for review. 
